讲座题目：Acquiring patents for monopoly（收购专利以垄断化）

主讲人：徐建欢 新加坡管理大学 助理教授

时间：2023年6月27日09:00

地点：A208

主持人：罗璇，十大信誉赌博官网平台讲师

主办单位：十大信誉赌博官网平台世界经济系、美国加拿大经济研究所

内容简介：

The trade of patents has seen significant growth in recent decades due to various pro-patent trade policies. This paper quantifies the macro consequence of pro-patent trade policy in the context of China's firm income tax reform in 2008. Exploiting variation in patent trade tax across industries as an instrument to identify the causal effect of trade, we find that although more patents are created when trade is easier, the patent is more likely to be acquired by big firms and new patents are connected with big firms' existing technologies closer. We build an endogenous growth model featuring a patent trade market to study the welfare impact of the patent trade. Our findings indicate that subsidizing patent trade at a flat rate may actually decrease welfare due to the increase in monopoly power. Specifically, most distortions are from inventors changing their research directions to make patents easier to be acquired by monopolists. The optimal subsidy for patent trade is derived, which depends on the initial level of misallocation in the invention market。

近年来由于专利交易促进政策，专利交易得到显著增长。在中国2008年公司收入税改革的背景下，本文量化专利交易促进的宏观影响。将不同行业专利交易税作为工具变量识别专利交易的因果效应，我们发现：尽管在专利交易越容易的时候，会有更多专利产生，但是这些专利更容易被大公司收购，新的专利与大公司现有科技联系更加密切。我们构建了一个包括专利交易市场的内生性经济增长模型，研究专利交易的福利效应。我们发现，如果对所有交易的补贴率恒定，由于垄断加强，福利会减少。特别的，主要扭曲来源于发明家会创造更多利于垄断者收购的专利。专利交易最优补贴政策取决于发明市场的初始错配程度。

主讲人简介：

徐建欢，新加坡管理大学的经济学助理教授。研究和教学聚焦于生产率和经济增长，特别关注中国经济，作品发表在Review of Economic statistics, Journal of Development Economics等期刊上。